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REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE UNITED
STATES POST-SEPTEMBER 11

Andrew I. Schoenholtz*

To My Teacher and Colleague, Arthur Helton, Whose
Leadership and Example Inspires the Displaced And
All Those Who Work to Protect Them.
The plane full of Mghan refugees landed at John F. Kennedy
Airport (JFK) like many had prior to September 2001. The State
Department's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration had
selected these particular refugees for entry into the United States,
after each had been interviewed and approved by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service. The International Organization for
Migration had arranged transportation to the United States, where
these refugees would be resettled in a multitude of communities
throughout the country. Local church groups and community
organizations were prepared to receive them. l
Unfortunately, these Mghan refugees arrived at JFKjust two
weeks after terrorist attacks killed thousands in New York and

*
The author is the Deputy Director of Georgetown University's Institute
for the Study of International Migration and teaches refugee and immigration
law and policy at Georgetown University Law Center and Walsh School of
Foreign Service. This analysis depends considerably on data provided by two U.S.
government agencies: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum,
and International Operations, United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Department of Homeland Security; and the Office of Planning, Analysis
and Technology, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Department of Justice.
The author is particularly grateful to the assistance extended to him by key
personnel at these agencies in terms of both providing and understanding asylum
data. The author would also like to thank two research assistants, Tracey King
and Chiara Spector, for their help on this article.
1.

Interview with U.S. government official in Washington, D.C. (Oct. 17,

2001).
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toppled the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center. Airport officials
alerted Mayor Giuliani's office that hundreds of Afghans had just
arrived by plane at JFK. Alarmed, the Mayor called Vice President
Cheney. Within days, the premier refugee resettlement program in
the world that had brought some 2.5 million refugees to the United
States since 1975 was shut down. 2 Almost three years later, this
program is still running at only about two-thirds of its previous
capacity; more than 100,000 refugees have lost opportunities to build
new lives in the United States during this period. 3
The U.S. refugee resettlement program, which David Martin
writes about in this issue, was the first refugee protection casualty of
the terrorist attacks. American officials perceived resettlement as
being particularly vulnerable to security problems. 4 That was not the
case with the other major U.S. refugee protection program, the
asylum system. That system was effectively revamped in 1995 to
address a variety of abuses, in part connected to individuals involved
in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. 5 Yet, even though official
attention did not focus on asylum 6 , subtle, significant changes have
occurred. This article delineates and assesses these changes by
closely examining data and developments at all levels of the asylum
2.
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State,
Cumulative Summary of Refugee Admissions FY 1975-2004 (2004).
3.
The United States planned to resettle up to 70,000 refugees in each of
FY 2002, 2003, and 2004. Of those 210,000, about 108,000 refugees were actually
admitted. Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Dep't of State,
Proposed Refugee Admissions for FY 2004-Report to Congress (2003), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/prmlasstlrVrptsl25691.htm (last visited January 20,
2005).
4.
U.S. Comm. for Refugees, In the Aftermath of September 11: U.S.
Refugee Resettlement on Hold, 22 Refugee Reports 1 (2001), available at
http://refugees.org/worldiarticles/aftermath_rr01_9-10.htm; Refugee Resettlement
in the United States Blocked, Stranding 22,000 Refugees, Asylum Protection
News 2, (Human Rights First, New York, N.Y.) Nov. 14, 2001, at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylumitorchlightinewsletter/newsleC2.htm.
5.
See U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., Dep't of Justice, Asylum
Reform: 5 Years Later 7-8 (2000), available at http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/
asylum/asylum_brochure. pdf.

6.
Only three years after the September 11th Attacks did Congress focus some
attention on asylum. See, H.R. 10, 108th Congo Title III (2004). No law changing the
asylum system has yet been enacted, nor has the Executive branch deemed it
necessary to once again reform that system.
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system. These more subtle changes cumulatively call into question
how robust the system truly is today. Finally, this study calls for
major changes to improve the protection of those refugees who
manage to reach the United States without government assistance.

I. REFUGEES SEEKING AsYLUM AT PORTS OF ENTRY OR NEAR THE
BORDER: EXPEDITED REMOVAL

European nations were the first to create rapid asylum
procedures, which were practiced in the major countries there by
1994.7 These procedures are aimed particularly at identifying
"manifestly unfounded" applications at the airports and other ports
of entry. Applicants arriving from "safe states" are screened out of
the regular asylum process and into an accelerated determination
system. B In Germany, for example, the asylum seeker in this
situation has forty-eight hours to apply.9 Rejected asylum seekers are
given three days to file an appeal with an administrative court. In
the United Kingdom, asylum seekers from "safe" countries are
returned within twenty-four hours.lO
In the United States, the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 created an expedited removal
procedure upon entry for those with fraudulent documentation or
without documentation.!l Under this procedure, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Secondary Immigration Inspectors are
tasked with discerning whether an individual fears return to the
country he came from. If no legitimate fear is ascertained and the
individual is determined to have no other legal right to enter the
United States, he is deported. If fear is found, the Secondary
7.
Susan Martin & Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Asylum in Practice: Successes,
Failures, and the Challenges Ahead, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 589, 602 (2000).

8.

Id.

9.
U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Worldwide Refugee Information, Country
Report: Germany (1997), http://www.refugees.org/worldlcountryrptleuropel1997/
germany.htm.
10.
U.S. Comm. for Refugees, Worldwide Refugee Information, Country
Report: United Kingdom (2002), http://www.refugees.org/worldlcountryrptleuropel
united_kingdom.htm.
11.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235(b), 8 U.S.C § 1225(b)
(2004); see Martin & Schoenholtz, supra note 7, at 602.
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Inspector refers the individual to a DHS Asylum Officer. At that
point, the asylum seeker must demonstrate that he has a credible
fear of persecution in order to continue with an asylum application.
The law mandates that the "credible fear" determination be made
swiftly and further requires reviewability of that determination by
an immigration judge, if requested, within one week. Detention is
mandated during this period of time, and generally attorneys play no
role in these proceedings. 12 Authorities began applying expedited
removal to those entering land and air ports of entry at the start of
the program in April 1997. In November 2002, authorities expanded
expedited removal to cover sea arrivals in response to two boats of
Haitians that reached Florida.13 In 2004, DHS expanded expedited
removal to cover areas within one hundred miles of the land borders
between ports of entry. 14
Since September 11th, the nuinber of asylum seekers
interviewed for credible fear determinations has dropped
considerably. As Chart 1 shows, the numbers dropped by twenty-five
percent in fiscal year (FY) 2002 from a high of 13,000 in FY 2001,
and then again by thirty-eight percent in FY 2003 to 6,000.1 5 In FY
2004, about 7,000 asylum seekers are expected to have credible fear
interviews,16 down almost half from FY 2001.l7

§

12.
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV), 8 U.s.C.
1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV).

13.
Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section
235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68924,
68925 (effective Nov. 13, 2002).
14.
Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48877-01
(effective Aug. 11, 2004).
15.
U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Credible
Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003 (2004) [hereinafter Credible Fear
Determinations FY 1997-2003) (on file with author). The fiscal year runs from
October 1 through September 29. See Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
State, Frequently Asked Questions (May 2004), at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/
piVpcl32868.htm#f(last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
16.
U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Credible
Fear Determinations FY 2004 (2004) [hereinafter Credible Fear Determinations
FY 2004) (on file with author).
17.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003, supra note 15.
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Chart 1. Credible Fear Referrals by DHS Asylum Office to Immigration Court, 1999-2003

1999

2000

2001

2002

Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations,

2003

users, DHS

Significant changes have occurred in the pool of asylum
seekers interviewed for credible fear. The two largest nationalities in
FY 2001, Chinese and Colombians, decreased about fifty percent in
each of FY 2002 and 2003. 18 Through June 2004, the number of
Chinese asylum seekers has not changed from FY 2003, but the
number of Colombians continues to decline.l 9 Sri Lankans
significantly decreased from over 1,000 to about sixty from FY 2001
to FY 2003 and remains small. 20 Cubans increased fivefold in
FY2002, then decreased more than fifty percent in FY 2003,21 but
have again increased substantially in the second and third quarters

18.

Id.

19.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004, supra note 16.

20.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003," supra note 15.

21.

Id.
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of FY 2004. 22 Haitians decreased twenty-five percent in FY 2002,
returned to around 1,000 in FY 2003,23 but have decreased
significantly in FY 2004.24

A.

Assessing the Drop in Numbers of Those Seeking Asylum
at U.S. Borders

Why has the number of asylum seekers interviewed for a
credible fear determination dropped so significantly since September
11th? In some instances, much depends on the specific circumstances
of the refugees' country of origin and its relationship with the United
States. For example, the number of Colombian asylum seekers was
seriously affected by new laws prohibiting transit through the United
States on the way to an international destination. In 2001, but prior
to September 11th, the United States stopped that practice because
of the number of asylum seekers from Colombia using a stopover to
claim asylum. According to a March 29, 2001 announcement by the
U.S. Embassy in Bogota:
These measures have been taken because of the great
increase in the number of Colombian citizens who travel to
the United States without a visa and who use the stop
there to claim asylum during their 'transit ... .'
Since January 1, 2001, more than 1,000 Colombian
citizens have applied for political asylum upon arrival at
Miami International Airport while in transit status. The
U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service office in
Miami is currently receiving about 30 requests for political
asylum daily from Colombians in transit status. Last week,
as many as 120 Colombians requested asylum in Miami in
just one day. All of the claimants have entered the United
States on the premise of transiting through the U.S. to a
third country without a visa. 25

In contrast to this denial of access, the extraordinary
decrease in the number of Sri Lankan asylum seekers may be due to
22.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004, supra note 16.

23.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003, supra note 15.

24.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004," supra note 16.

25.
U.S. Embassy, Bogota, Colombia, New Visa Requirement for
Colombians Transiting the U.S. Enroute to Third Countries, at
http://bogota.usembassy.gov/wwwsvtle.shtml (last modified Mar. 29, 2001).

HeinOnline -- 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 328 2004-2005

2005 REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE U.S. POST 9/11

329

important progress made in peace negotiations aimed at solving the
lengthy civil conflict. In February 2002, a ceasefire entered into force
between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tamil
Tigers of Ealam (LTTE).26 By the end of 2002, the parties agreed "to
explore a political solution founded on internal self-determination
based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka."27 While the
road to such a political solution remains a rocky one, it is likely that
these political developments affected the number of Sri Lankans who
had credible fear interviews after FY 2001.
The movement of Cubans into the United States through the
southern border has resulted in Cubans becoming an important part
of the credible fear process. Following serious enforcement measures
targeting speedboat entries in the late 1990s, Cubans appear to have
developed legal ways to travel to Mexico and perhaps Central
American countries. 28 Smuggling operations may also have played a
role in this development. In any event, once in Mexico, Cubans have
found their way to the land ports of entry and requested admission to
the United States. As of June 2004, Cubans were the largest group to
receive credible fear interviews in FY 2004, more than twice as large
as the number two nationality (China) and more than six times as
large as the number three nationality (Haiti).29 Haitians have been
heavily discouraged from coming to the United States by the Bush
Administration and may not have the option of reaching U.s. land
ports of entry as do some Cubans.
Several additional factors explain why numbers have
decreased so significantly post-September 11, after having steadily
and significantly increased until that point. Since the terrorist
attacks, the American government has more actively controlled
admission at the air ports of entry, where asylum seekers have often
26.
Press Release, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Announcement
of Sri Lanka ceasefire (Feb. 22, 2002), at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/aktuelU
presseml032171-070011/dok-bn.html (statement of Jan Petersen, Foreign
Minister of Norway) (last visited Jan. 26,2005).
27.
Press Release, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Breakthrough in
Sri Lanka Peace Negotiations (Dec. 5, 2002), at http://odin.dep.no/ud/engelsk/
aktueltlpresseml032171-990029/dok-bu.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
28.
Telephone Interview with U.S. official at the Dep't of Homeland
Security (Sept. 1, 2004).
29.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004, supra note 16.
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sought entry.30 The international public is aware of this, and
potential asylum seekers may have become increasingly afraid to
travel with fraudulent documentation or without documents
altogether as compared to before September 11th. Furthermore, the
American government has increased its pre-screening activities at
airports abroad. U.s. immigration officials examine airline
passengers and their documents while they are waiting to board
their flights. In addition, fewer people may have considered the
United States a haven for refugees in light of the public efforts to
tighten access to domestic borders.
The enforcement focus has been pervasive. In March 2003,
DHS announced Operation Liberty Shield, an initiative targeted at
increasing security for Americans through various measures,
including increased border security.31 With regard to asylum seekers,
the initiative required the detention of applicants from nations where
al-Qaeda, or other terrorist groups, are known to have operated, for
the duration of their processing period. 32 Previously, asylum seekers
were only held beyond an initial screening period on a case-by-case
basis. In April 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a
precedent decision ordering that a Haitian asylum seeker who
arrived in the United States by boat despite interdiction efforts by
the Coast Guard be held without bond. Citing national security
concerns, Ashcroft reversed the BIA ruling calling for his release on a
$2,500 bond while his asylum claim was pending. 33 Similarly, in
2003, federal prosecutors in South Florida began cracking down on
asylum seekers by criminally charging those who entered the United

30.
See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Dep't
of Homeland Security, Fact Sheet: U.S. Customs and Border Protection Actions
Taken Since 9/11 (Sept. 17, 2004), at http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/
fact_sheetsl09172004.xml (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
Secretary Tom Ridge, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, Press Briefing
31.
on Operation Liberty Shield, (Mar. 18, 2003), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspubliC/
display?content=525 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
Operation Liberty Shield was announced and then cancelled within a
32.
short time. Press Release, Department of Homeland Security, Remarks by
Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge to the National Press Club (April 29,
2003) available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=582 (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).

33.

In re D-J, 23 I. & N. Dec. 572, 574 (A.G. 2003).
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States with false documents. 34 This marks a reversal of previous U.S.
policy deferring to the U.N. Refugee Convention, which states that
member countries cannot impose penalties on asylum seekers who
present themselves without delay and show good cause for their
illegal entry. The Convention policy is based on concerns that false
documentation might be the only means of escape for many asylum
seekers.35
In 2004, DHS instituted the US-VISIT program, which is
intended to verify the identity of visitors to the United States
through a biometric digital fingerscan and photograph system. 36
Visitors' fingerprints are collected overseas at consular visa posts and
checked against a database of known criminals and suspected
terrorists. These fingerprints are then verified upon arrival at a port
of entry in the United States. 37 Currently, US-VISIT requires
fingerprinting of most non-U.S. citizens traveling to the United
States on a visa, including most students, business travelers, and
tourists. By September 30, 2004, the requirement will be extended to
include visitors traveling under the Visa Waiver Program. 38
Furthermore, the DHS budget for FY 2005 significantly
increases funding for screening procedures and detention, removal,
34.
Stanley Mailman & Stephen Yale-Loehr, Detaining and Criminalizing
Asylum Seekers, 8 Bender's Immigr. Bull. 764 (May 1, 2003).
35.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951,
art. 31, 19 U.S.T. 6259,6275,189 U.N.T.S. 137, 174 (entered into force Apr. 22,
1954). The Ninth Circuit agreed with the longstanding U.S. position, pointing out
that the BIA has clearly distinguished between the use of fraudulent documents
to establish an asylum claim and the use of such documents for the purpose of
escaping immediate danger from an alien's country of origin. The second purpose
does not destroy an asylum claim. Akinmade v. INS, 196 F.3d 951, 955 (9th Cir.
1999) (quoting In re O-D-, Interim Decision 3334, 1998 WL 24904 (BIA Jan. 20,
2003».
36.
U. S. Dep't of Homeland Security, US-VISIT, at http://www.dhs.gov/
dhspubliC/interapp/content_multUmage/content_multUmage_0006.xm1
(last
visited Jan. 26, 2005).
37.

Id.

38.
See id. The visa waiver program (VWP) allows foreign nationals of
twenty-seven enumerated countries to be admitted to the United States for
tourism or business for up to ninety days without a visa. U.S. Dep't of State, Visa
Waiver Program, at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspubliC/interapp/editoriaVeditoriaC
0527.xml (Jan. 26, 2005).
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and enforcement proceedings. The new budget calls for $411 million
in new funding to maintain and enhance border security activities. 39
This includes an increase of $12 million over the FY 2004 funding to
continue expansion of the US-VISIT system and an increase of $20.6
million to support the CBP Targeting Systems, which aid in
identifying high-risk cargo and passengers. 40 The budget also
provides for an increase of $186 million to fund improvements in
immigration enforcement, including a $108 million increase for the
detention and removal of illegal aliens and an increase of $78 million
for detecting and locating individuals in the United States who are in
violation of immigration laws. 41 Overall, the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) budget increases by almost ten percent
over FY 2004.42
In light of the significant decrease in the number of asylum
seekers identified in the expedited removal process, it is critical to
know whether Immigration Inspectors are recognizing all those who
legitimately fear return to their home countries. Both the Clinton
and Bush administrations made it impossible for an independent,
non-governmental observer to answer that question, as neither
allowed any independent expert study of the expedited removal
system. Only three agencies have been permitted to examine certain
aspects of the inspection process in the expedited removal system.
Examining the first seven months of the new expedited removal
system, the United States General Accounting Office performed
random documentation checks and found "mixed results as to
whether inspectors and supervisors were consistently documenting
that they followed various steps in INS' expedited removal process."43

39.
Press Release, U.s. Dep't of Homeland Security, Department of
Homeland Security Announces FY 2005 Budget in Brief (Feb. 2, 2004), at
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspubliddisplay?content=3133 (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
40.

[d.

41.

[d.

42.

[d.

43.
U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report to Congo Comms., Illegal Aliens:
Changes in the Process of Denying Aliens Entry Into the United States,
GAO/GGD-98-81, at 38 (1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/
gg98081.pdf.
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More recently, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) conducted a limited, confidential study on
expedited removal for DHS, which was completed in October 2003. 44
The New York Times obtained a copy ofUNHCR's report from a nonUN official concerned about the expansion of expedited removal
powers to the Border Patrol announced in August 2004. According to
the New York Times,45 UNHCR found that most airport inspectors
properly identified asylum seekers and correctly referred them for
credible fear interviews, but important problems existed. Many
inspectors held negative views of asylum seekers, considering them
to be frauds. The report concluded that this attitude resulted in
instances where inspectors intimidated asylum seekers or treated
them with derision. At John F. Kennedy International Airport in
New York, inspectors routinely handcuffed asylum seekers and
restrained them with belly chains and leg restraints. In one instance
there, inspectors ordered a Liberian asylum seeker to remove his
clothes to determine whether he had scars consistent with torture
and then allegedly ridiculed him with racial and sexual taunts. The
report described two instances in which inspectors encouraged
asylum seekers not to pursue asylum claims. UNHCR also reported
that inspectors often failed to provide certified translators for those
who did not speak English, improperly notified consulates about the
identity and detention of asylum seekers, and in fourteen cases
mistakenly concluded that individuals who expressed a credible fear
of persecution were not entitled to apply for asylum. 46
The return of refugees to serious harm is very troubling, even
in isolated occurrences. UNHCR's study, as reported by the New
York Times, is a limited examination of the inspection process. As
DHS proceeds to expand expedited removal, however, it is critical
that this part of the process becomes transparent. DHS officials say
that they have responded to the problems UNHCR identified and
that Border Patrol officials will be better trained to protect asylum

44.
The author requested a copy of that report from DRS, but was informed
that it is not for public release. Telephone Interview with DRS official at ICE
(Sept. 1, 2004).
45.
Rachel L. Swarns, U.N. Report Cites Harassment at American Airports
ofAsylum Seekers, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13,2004, at All.
46.

[d.
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seekers. Yet, the public must have confidence that these problems
have been addressed and that the training is effective.
Currently, the U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom is completing an extensive study of the impact of expedited
removal on asylum seekers.47 Monitors observed the secondary
inspection process at several key expedited removal sites on a fulltime basis over a few weeks. The final report is expected to be
released in January 2005. 48 That study should shed light on the
inspection of asylum seekers in expedited removal and provide for
ways to address any identified problems.

B.

Recommendations for Reforming Expedited Removal As
Applied to Asylum Seekers

DRS should take three steps to ensure that the inspection
system is identifYing those who fear return. First, the agency should
conduct its own systematic review of secondary inspection in the
context of expedited removal. Second, DRS should videotape the
process for quality control purposes. This is already being done in at
least one site, but should be expanded nationally. Finally, the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom did not use actual
testers to determine how well the process is working. DHS should
allow for independent testing of the secondary inspection process in
expedited removal. By taking these steps, DRS will be able to build
public confidence in its capacity to protect refugees.
With regard to those individuals referred by inspectors to
Asylum Officers, almost all who have received a credible fear
determination have met the credible fear requirements and
participate in full hearing proceedings before an Immigration Judge,
as discussed below. 49 This has not changed since September 11, 200l.
Of those cases where credible fear was decided, ninety-eight percent
of asylum seekers met the requirements in FY 2000, and ninety-nine

47.
U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom, Annual Report of the U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom (2004), available at
http://www.uscirf.gov/reportS/12May04l2004annuaIRpt.pdf (last visited Jan. 26,
2005).
48.
Interview with official at the U.S. Comm'n on Int'l Religious Freedom
(Sept. 28, 2004).
49.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 1997-2003, supra note 15.
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percent in FY 2001, FY 2002, and FY 2003. 50 Through three quarters
of FY 2004, only seventeen of some 4500 asylum seekers have been
found not to have a credible fear. 51
While those concerned that the credible fear requirements
are too lax argue that they should be tightened, such a change risks
returning refugees to countries of persecution in violation of U.S.
international obligations and domestic law. Since U.S. officials are
placing almost all of these individuals into immigration court
proceedings in order to ensure that the United States lives up to its
protection commitments, the government should return to the preexpedited removal policy and place individuals seeking asylum
directly into Immigration Court proceedings without spending the
valuable time of Asylum Officers and Immigration Judges on credible
fear determinations. This is particularly called for given that the
United States has implemented a reasonably efficient and effective
asylum system, as more fully detailed below.

II. REFUGEES SEEKING AsYLUM THROUGH AsYLUM OFFICER
INTERVIEWS

Asylum determinations are decisions made by sovereign
states as to whether an individual's claim for refugee status is valid.
Generally, a grant of asylum enables a refugee to remain in the host
country, often permanently. To qualify for asylum, an asylum seeker
must meet the requirements of the refugee definition set forth in the
1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol as implemented
by domestic laws. 52 Procedures governing these individualized

50.

Id.

51.

Credible Fear Determinations FY 2004, supra note 16.

Immigration and Nationality Act §§ (101)(a)(42) and 208, 8 U.S.C. §§
52.
1101(a)(42) and 1158, respectively. As the Supreme Court stated in I.N.S. v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987), "[i)f one thing is clear from the
legislative history of the new definition of 'refugee,' and indeed the entire 1980
[Refugee) Act, it is that one of Congress' primary purposes was to bring United
States refugee law into coriformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol
Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the
United States acceded in 1968." See also U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, History of the United States Asylum Officer Corps, § I(b), at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/services/asylum/history.htm (last modified Sept. 9,
2003).
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determinations vary among states and include both adversarial and
non-adversarial proceedings and appeals. The substantive and
procedural law of asylum is complex, making the process a very
challenging one for those asylum seekers who do not have legal
representation, experience the proceedings through translation,
generally fear interactions with government officials, and may be
held in detention. The challenges to decision-makers are also
considerable. Decision-makers must understand the human rights
conditions in the countries from which asylum seekers flee. They also
need detailed information on the persecution feared or experienced
by the asylum seeker. Many states have faced significant problems in
operating fair and efficient asylum systems particularly when they
receive very large numbers of applications. However, reforms have
enabled certain states to develop systems that reasonably balance
the refugee's interest in protection and the state's interest in
minimizing abuse.
In assessing whether an individual has a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, nationality, religion, social group, or
political opinion, decision-makers examine both objective conditions
in the country of origin and the individual's particular situation.
Decision-makers need access to current human rights information to
understand country conditions. They also must ascertain information
from the asylum seeker about their fear of persecution. This can be
challenging since refugees often have to leave their countries
precipitously and thus rarely bring with them documentation of their
plight. If applicants do produce documentation, it is often difficult for
the decision maker to ascertain its authenticity. As discussed below,
the credibility of the asylum seeker often becomes the critical issue in
determining eligibility for refugee status.
Proof of the claimant's fear of persecution is one of the major
challenges in asylum determinations. Unless the asylum seeker is a
high profile dissident, newspaper accounts concerning her political
activities likely do not exist. Women raped as part of a policy of
ethnic cleansing are unlikely to have medical records of any posttraumatic hospitalization. The claimant's testimony is most often the
major evidence available to the decision-maker in determining
eligibility for refugee status. Decision-makers are faced with
assessing the credibility of that testimony. They often look for
sufficient and plausible details that support the claim and make
sense in relation to the human rights situation in a particular
country. But what does it mean if the claimant provides different
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dates (days or months) for certain important events described? What
if the claimant relates his or her history in a halting manner? Or
does not look the decision-maker in the eye when providing
testimony? Are these indicators of untruthfulness? Some decisionmakers interpret these actions as such; others do not. Considerable
cultural knowledge is needed to interpret the behavior of asylum
applicants who come from all over the world. Difficulties in
remembering dates are a common problem for victims of persecution.
Given these challenges, we now examine the first stage of
actual asylum determinations, where asylum seekers voluntarily
come forward to the DRS and file a claim, knowing that they will be
placed into removal proceedings if they are not successful and have
no pre-existing legal immigration status in the United States. 53 The
vast majority of asylum seekers enter the U.S. asylum system in this
"affirmative" manner.54

A.

The State of the Affirmative Asylum System in the United
States

In evaluating the state of the affirmative asylum system in
the United States, some important overview questions must be
addressed. First, how many individuals voluntarily come forward
and identify themselves to the government in the hopes that they
will obtain asylum? Following the major reforms implemented in
January 1995, the numbers declined, then rose, and are now
declining again. New affirmative asylum claims55 numbered
somewhat under 50,000 in FY 1996 and 1997 (see Chart 2).56 The

53.
Most asylum claimants who come forward have no legal immigration
status in the United States. U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland
Security, Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003 (2004) [hereinafter
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003J (on file with author).

54.
See generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Obtaining
Asylum
in
the
United
States:
Two
Paths
to
Asylum,
at
httpj/uscis.gov/graphicsiservicesiasylum/paths.htm (last modified Nov. 29, 2004).
55.
U.S. officials maintain data based on the number of claims. One claim
represents more than one individual where a spouse and children accompany the
principal claimant.
56.

Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53.
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Chart 2. Affirmative Asylum Claims, Asylum Office, 1996·2004
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Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International
Operations, uscrs, DHS

number of claims dropped to 34,000 and 31,000 in FY 1998 and 1999,
respectively. 57 Asylum seekers filed almost 40,000 claims in FY 2000
and then almost 59,000 claims in FY 2001. 58 Asylum seekers filed
about the same number during the fiscal year following September
11th. 59 Some 43,000 asylum seekers filed affirmative claims in FY
2003, more than twenty-five percent less than the previous fiscal
year. 60 In FY 2004, that number is on track to drop another thirtyfive percent to about 28,000 cases. 61 That will set a new record low.
Second, from what countries have asylum seekers come?
China, Colombia, and Haiti have been the three largest groups by far
prior to and after September 11th.62 However, the number of Chinese

57.

[d.

58.

[d.

59.

[d.

60.

[d.

61.
U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Asylum
2004 QS Top 50 (2004) [hereinafter Asylum 2004 QS Top 50] (on file with author).
62.
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53.
Mexicans have voluntarily entered the affirmative asylum system in large
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numbers during this period principally in order to be placed into Immigration
Court proceedings where they can seek relief other than asylum. Since they are
generally not seeking asylum, they are not included in the analysis articulated in
this article. The USCIS Asylum Office explains this phenomenon as follows:
Evidence strongly suggests that most Mexican asylum
applicants have been using the USCIS asylum program as a
conduit to enter into removal proceedings. Once in removal
proceedings, these individuals typically withdraw their
respective asylum applications and file applications for another
immigration benefit (cancellation of removal), which can only
be filed in removal proceedings. Upon filing for cancellation of
removal, they become eligible to receive employment
authorization because, unlike the asylum process, the
cancellation of removal process allows individuals to apply for
and receive employment authorization immediately upon
submission of an application for cancellation of removal while
their applications are pending, without regard to how long the
cancellation of removal application has been pending.
Moreover, by withdrawing their asylum applications,
these individuals remove themselves from the court's fast-track
calendar for asylum cases, which is based on the 180-day
deadline by which asylum applications must be adjudicated
before individuals receive employment authorization. The
Department of Justice first instituted this fast-track system in
1995 as part of a comprehensive reform of the asylum system,
creating a more efficient and effective process that denies nonmeritorious claims quickly without discouraging legitimate
refugees. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) later codified this 180-day
deadline, requiring the Department to adjudicate asylum
applications filed on or after April 1, 1997 within 180 days from
the date of filing. See section 208(d)(5)(A)(iii) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C.
1158(d)(5)(A)(iii). To provide the Immigration Court with
sufficient time to meet this statutory 180-day deadline for
cases filed affirmatively with USCIS and later referred to
Immigration Court, the USCIS's asylum program has
established a policy aimed at completing the vast majority of
its referrals within 60 days from the date of filing-making the
affirmative asylum process a very quick access point to removal
proceedings.
In the last several years, however, the USCIS asylum
program has seen significant drops in asylum applications filed
by Mexican nationals from 9,316 filed in FY 2002 to 4,111 filed
in FY 2003. In FY 2004, the program anticipates receiving
approximately 1,500 asylum applications. The exact reasons
for this decline in receipts is currently unknown, although we
believe the decline may be related to local law enforcement
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and Colombian affirmative asylum seekers decreased precipitously in
FY 2003. 63 Nothing has changed in these countries to suggest that
fewer asylum seekers would make claims in the United States;
however, the policies and practices instituted by the U.S. government
have probably affected these numbers, as discussed further below.
Other significant nationalities in the affirmative asylum system
before September 11th include Somalia, EI Salvador, Indonesia,
Armenia, Ethiopia, and India. 64 In FY 2002, Somalia numbers
decreased significantly and have remained small since. 65 Asylum
seekers from Cameroon have applied in larger numbers beginning in
FY 2002.66 During the first three quarters of FY 2004, Venezuelan
asylum seekers have applied in larger numbers.67 These nationality
changes may very well reflect shifts in home country instability,
among other factors.
Why are the overall numbers down? Are asylum seekers
more afraid to identify themselves voluntarily to U.S. government
officials in a post-September 11th climate that emphasizes
enforcement and removal rather than protection? Are fewer asylum
seekers finding ways to come to the United States because of tighter
controls? Are fewer considering the United States a haven for
refugees? These are all serious possibilities and constitute the best
hypothesis this author has so far developed to explain this major
decrease.
Those who have come forward voluntarily have fared
differently in their quest for protection. As Chart 3 shows, the
Asylum Officer approval rates have decreased significantly since FY

actions in California that have resulted in the prosecution of
several unscrupulous preparers who have advised Mexican
nationals in the U.S. to manipulate the asylum program in the
manner described above, as well as local publicity campaigns to
inform the community of these illegal practices.
Email from U.S. Headquarters Asylum Division, Department of Homeland
Security, to Andrew I. Schoenholtz (Aug. 26. 2004) (on file with author).
63.
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53.
64.

Id.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.

67.

Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61.

HeinOnline -- 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 340 2004-2005

2005 REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE U.S. POST 9/11

341

2002.68 Approval rates are down from more than 50% in FY 2000 and
2001 to about 40% in FY 2003 and 2004 (through June 30).69
In terms of the three largest nationalities, the Chinese approval
rates have decreased significantly in FY 2003 and 2004, and the
Colombian rates did so beginning in FY 2002. 70 The Chinese rates
fell from above to below average rates-from 55%, 64%, and 60%
approval rates in FY 2000, 2001, and 2002, respectively, to 45% and
36% in FY 2003 and 2004, respectively.71 Colombian rates fell
significantly as well, though they remain above average-from 68%
and 62% in FY 2000 and 2001, respectively, to 45%,46%, and 48% in
FY 2002, 2003, and 2004.72 Finally, the Haitian rates increased from
22% in 2000 to 36% in 2001 and have held in the 31-37% range
since. 73 At one point well below average, the Haitians are now only
somewhat below average. The significant drop in Chinese and
Colombian approval rates certainly contributes in an important
manner to the overall decline-these two nationalities accounted for
36% of the merits decisions in FY 2002, 29% in FY 2003, and 20% in
FY 2004.74

68.
U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Asylum
Approval Rates by Office FY 2000-2004 (2004) (on file with author).
69.
In calculating the approval rates, the author only considers decisions on
the substantive merits of the asylum case: did an Asylum Officer determine that
an individual did or did not have a bona fide asylum claim? Accordingly, the
calculation divides the number of grants by the number of grants, denials, and
referrals to Immigration Court based on an interview. Individuals referred to the
Immigration Court on procedural grounds for not having met the one-year
application deadline are not considered as decisions on the merits of the refugee
claim itself. The USC IS Asylum Office does include the one-year referrals in their
approval rate calculations as it is an eligibility requirement.
70.
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53;
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61.
71.
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53;
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61.
72.
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53;
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61.
73.
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53;
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61.
74.
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53;
Asylum FY 2004 QS Top 50, supra note 61.

HeinOnline -- 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 341 2004-2005

342

COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW

[36:323

Chart 3. Asylum Office Approval Rates, 2000·2004
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What accounts for these major declines in the approval rates
of Chinese and Colombian asylum seekers? Again, nothing
significant has changed regarding the human rights and conflict
context in these countries. With regard to those seeking asylum
based on coercive population control, for example, are Asylum
Officers finding applicants less credible than in the past? With
regard to Colombians, did more of the earlier arrivals flee
persecution as opposed to civil conflict? The data do not answer these
questions, and no information clearly suggests that such possibilities
are true. However, one of the weaknesses in the U.S. protection
system is that there is no fair and effective mechanism to provide
individuals with temporary protection during civil conflict. This
protection gap may be significant and is discussed further below.
The decline in Chinese and Colombian approval rates does
not completely account for the more than 20% decline in the overall
asylum approval rate. Statistics regarding nationalities also do not
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reveal any major changes in terms of the types of countries from
which asylum seekers originate. They are generally countries where
conflict, instability, and/or human rights violations force many to flee
from persecution and other serious forms of harm. It is possible that
some Asylum Officers became less generous in their decision-making
post September 11th, particularly with regard to the most difficult
decisions involving asylum seekers fleeing states in the midst of
terrible civil wars. The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol,
of course, do not protect those fleeing civil conflict, and the United
States does not yet practice the system common in Europe whereby
those denied asylum are provided with a temporary form of
protection if they are fleeing conflict.
With regard to other possible factors, gender does not appear
to account for the overall decline. 75 The percentage of women
applying for asylum did not change significantly from FY 19992003. 76 About 38% of applicants have been female in each of these
recent fiscal years. Neither does representation account for this
decline-or more precisely the lack of representation, since 65-70%
of asylum seekers in the first instance have not been represented
during FY 1999-2003. 77
The data do reveal that the approval rates at two of the eight
Asylum Offices decreased significantly more than other offices. As
Chart 4 shows, Los Angeles declined from a high of 67% in FY 2001
to a low of 31% in FY 2004. Houston decreased from a 44% approval
rate in FY 2001 to an 18% rate in 2003, and reached a 23% rate in
2004. 78 It is not clear what factors influenced those major declines,
but such significant changes should be fully investigated.
Even with the decline in approval rates, the affirmative
asylum system remains robust: 40% of those whose full claims are

75.
U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security,
Affirmative Asylum Applications by Gender FY 1998-2003 (2004) (on file with
author).
76.

[d.

77.
U.S. Headquarters Asylum Division, Dep't of Homeland Security, All
Offices Summary, Reform, By Representation, FY 1999-2003 (2004) (on file with
author).
78.
U.S. Headquarters Asylum Division, Dep't of Homeland Security,
Asylum Approval Rates by Office FY 2000-2004 (2004) (on file with author).
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heard in the first instance receive asylum. 79 Compared to pre-reform,
the system continues to provide protection to a significant number of
refugees at this first stage.

Chart 4. Asylum Approval Rates, Los Angeles and Houston Offices, 2001 v. 2004
[fIIlI2001 1m 2004 [

Los Angeles

Houston

Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and
International Operations, USCIS, DRS

B.

Recommendations to Improve Affirmative Asylum

The robust asylum rate does not mean that the system is as
good as it should be. The one-year deadline requirement was a major
problem for many applicants prior the terrorist attacks and remains
a major challenge. Pursuant to a 1996 law, the United States
requires applicants to file for asylum within one year of the
claimant's arrival in the country.80 The only exceptions to this rule
are changed circumstances that materially affect the applicant's

79.

Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53.

80.
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4
(a)(2)(B)(ii) (1996).
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Chart 5. One-Year Deadline Referrals by Asylum. Office to Immigration Court,
2000-2003
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Source: Headquarters Asylum Division, Office of Refugee, Asylum, and International Operations, users, DHS

eligibility for asylum S1 or extraordinary circumstances relating to the
delay in filing.82 The data shows that this procedural requirement
has disqualified large numbers of persecution claims from
consideration by decision-makers. As Chart 5 shows, since 2000 the
DRS Asylum Office has referred more than 25,000 asylum seekers to
Immigration Court because they did not meet the one-year
application deadline. 83 Clearly, very high numbers of people do not
have their substantive claims heard in the first instance. While this
problem pre-dates the terrorist attacks, the situation has only
worsened since September 11th.
Those who object to such time limits argue that genuine
refugees often have good reasons for failing to file their claims

81.
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4
(a)(4) (1996).
Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, 8 C.F.R. § 208.4
82.
(a)(5) (1996).
83.
U.S. Headquarters Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, 1 Year Deadline
Rejections by Asylum Office 1998-2004 (2004) (on file with author). These
numbers do not include Mexicans who entered the affirmative asylum system to
be placed into removal proceedings in order to apply for other forms of relief.
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immediately or soon after arrival. Many refugees are traumatized.
Unless they are in countries that provide them with food and shelter,
their first priority is survival-finding relatives, friends, or others of
all, filing an asylum application that survives referral is
extraordinarily difficult without help from a lawyer or other who will
help them. Language barriers, as well as ignorance ofthe law, hinder
compliance with such deadlines. Perhaps most important
professional who specializes in asylum law. There is no evidence that
the imposition of time limits decreases abusive claims. As discussed
above, it is clear, however, that such restrictions limit the access of
bona fide claimants to a decision on the merits. The 1996 U.S. law
has now limited the rights of tens of thousands of individuals to seek
asylum. 84
If an asylum system is effective, the imposition of time limits
and expedited processes is not needed to control abuse. If viewed in
sum, the U.S. asylum system is generally an effective one. Decisions
are made in a timely fashion: two separate decisions, by Asylum
Officers and Immigration Judges, are made in most affirmative cases
within six months of the application's receipt at the Asylum Office. 85
Furthermore, approval rates are significant and those denied asylum
often come from countries in civil conflict. This indicates that
significant abuse is not the problem it was prior to the 1995 reforms.
Accordingly, the United States should eliminate the time deadline or,
in the very least, impose a very generous one, such as five years.
The U.S. government and all other stakeholders in the
affirmative asylum system should be troubled by the significant
decreases in both the absolute number of applicants and the grant
rate. By and large, the circumstances that propelled forced migrants
to the United States have not changed. While the overall grant rate

84.
See Asylum By Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53;
1 Year Deadline Rejections by Asylum Office FY 1998--2004, supra note 83. As
discussed above, the Asylum Office has rejected more than 25,000 claims based
on this artificial deadline. While some of these asylum seekers may find relief
under withholding of removal or the Convention Against Torture, these
alternative forms of relief require significantly greater proof to demonstrate
eligibility. In any event, unless an Immigration Judge overturns the Asylum
Officer rejection based on the deadline, asylum is not available.
85.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Frequently Asked Questions
About Asylum, at http://uscis.gov/graphicslserviceslasylumlfaq.htm#how9 (last
visited Nov. 20, 2004).

HeinOnline -- 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 346 2004-2005

2005 REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE U.S. POST 9/11

347

is still relatively high, access and protection problems are of
considerable concern. American immigration officials need to
understand this decline more thoroughly to be able to address the
problems of access and protection.

III. REFUGEES SEEKING AsYLUM IN REGULAR IMMIGRATION COURT
HEARINGS

Asylum claims are also decided in Immigration Court, which
has been part of the Justice Department's Executive Office for
Immigration Review (EOIR) since 1983. 86 Most of the claims are
referred by USCIS Asylum Officers. 87 On average, from 1999 to 2003,
about seventy-two percent of asylum claims filed in Immigration
Court came from this "affirmative" system. 88 Asylum seekers who
have not voluntarily come forward to request protection may also
raise a claim after they are placed in removal proceedings. Such
"defensive" claims accounted for the other asylum cases in
Immigration Court.89
In the last five years, the number of asylum claims first
decreased slightly, then increased significantly, and finally
decreased. The number of asylum cases increased twenty percent in
FY 2002 to about 74,000, and then decreased twelve percent in FY
2003 to some 65,000. 90 Given the decline in the number of affirmative
asylum cases, the number of Immigration Court asylum claims will
continue to decrease.
In contrast to the declining grant rates in Asylum Officer
decisions, Immigration Judge grant rates have held relatively steady

86.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, Mission, and Functions Manual: Executive Office
for Immigration Review (March 2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
jmd/mps/manuaVeoir.htm.
87.
EOIR Office of Planning and Analysis, Dep't of Justice, FY 2003
Statistical Yearbook, at 11 (2004) available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/statspub/fy03syb.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004) [hereinafter FY 2003
Statistical Yearbook].
88.

[d.

89.

U.s. Citizenship and Immigration Services, supra note 54.

90.

Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53.
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from 2000 to 2003. 91 The approval rate has increased significantly
since the 1995 asylum reforms. 92 Almost four out of every ten
decisions (grants and denials) are grants.93 In fact, the approval rate
of the affirmative (Asylum Officer) cases referred to' Immigration
Court was forty-four percent during FY 2001-2003, considerably
higher than the defensive grant rate-even including one-year
deadline referrals from the Asylum Office (see Chart 6).94
. Thus, when merits determinations are made in the first two
instances, the U.S. asylum system continues to be quite robust. The
Asylum Officer approval rate in FY 2003 was around forty-one
percent,95 and the Immigration Court about thirty-seven percent.96
With regard to decision making since the terrorist attacks, the
Immigration Judges continue to grant the same proportion of
referred cases as they did previously.97 Unfortunately, without
longitudinal data, analysts cannot draw any conclusions about how
Immigration Judges evaluate the merits of first instance decisions.
Since such feedback to Asylum Officers would be very useful, EOIR

91.

FY 2003 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 87, at Kl.

92.
See EOIR Office of Planning and Analysis, Dep't of Justice,
Immigration Courts FY 1997 Asylum Statistics, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY97AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004);
Immigration Courts FY 1998 Asylum Statistics, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY98AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004);
Immigration Courts FY 1999 Asylum Statistics, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY99AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004);
Immigration Courts FY 2000 Asylum Statistics, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFYOOAsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004);
Immigration Courts FY 2001 Asylum Statistics, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY01AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004);
Immigration Courts FY 2002 Asylum Statistics, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY02AsyStats.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2004);
Immigration Courts FY 2003 Asylum S~atistics, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/eoir/efoiaIFY03AsyStats.pdf(lastvisitedNov. 20, 2004).
93.

FY 2003 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 87, at Kl.

94.

[d. at K2.

95.
U.S. Headquarters Asylum Div., Dep't of Homeland Security, Asylum
Office FY 2003 (2004) (on file with author).
96.

FY 2003 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 87, at Kl.

97.

[d.
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Chart 6. Affirmative and Defensive Grant Rates, Immigration Court, 2001-2003
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and the Asylum Office should develop a system to track individuals
through all the administrative decisions.
With respect to other nationality trends, five countries
consistently topped the list in absolute number of grants in FY 2001,
2002, and 2003: China, Colombia, Albania, India and Haiti (see
Chart 7).98 In FY 2002 and 2003, refugees from these five countries
accounted for more than fifty percent of all grants. 99 Since September
11th, most of the top fifteen nationalities granted asylum have
remained in that top grouping. Only Sri Lankans and Somalis
declined in number, as the number of asylum applicants from those
countries decreased.1 0o As suggested previously, these changes may
reflect, among other factors, relative improvements in the stability of

98.
Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53.
Several of these countries also ranked among the top five in absolute number of
denials in FY 2001, 2002, and 2003 (see Chart 8).
99.

Id.

100.

Id.
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Chart 7. Asylum Applications Granted by Immigration Court, 1999-2003
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Source: DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Asylum Statistics, 1999-2003
Note: Grants include conditional grants of Chinese asylum seekers.

these two countries, but they may also reflect greater scrutiny of visa
applications and efforts at border control.
With respect to nationality, China has been at the very top in
grants and applications for a number of years.lOl Due to the
Congressional limit of 1,000 grants per year to those fleeing coercive
population control, even just halfway through FY 2004 there was a
substantial and growing backlog of nearly 9,000 conditionally
approved Chinese refugees awaiting a permanent grant.1 02 Because
of the backlog, these individuals cannot become permanent residents
and eventually citizens for significant periods of time. A Chinese
refugee granted conditional asylum today will wait more than nine
years before the grant becomes permanent. On top of that, these

101.

Asylum by Nationality and Deadline FY 1999-2003, supra note 53.

The fiscal year runs from October through September. See supra note
102.
15. As of March 2004, EOIR reported to DRS that 8,954 Chinese with conditional
grants of asylum awaited their permanent grant. Email from EOIR, Office of
Planning, Analysis and Technology, Sept. 9, 2004 (on file with author).
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refugees must then wait another decade or more on the asylum
backlog for permanent resident status. 103
The lack of representation for asylum seekers in the
adversarial proceedings of Immigration Court is also problematic.
Representation matters in terms of outcomes. As this author found in
a previous study, asylum seekers referred to Immigration Court by
the Asylum Office are six times more likely to be granted asylum if
they are represented. 104 During FY 1999-2003, only forty-two to
forty-eight percent of non-citizens had representation.1 05 Experts
assert that represented cases generally make for a more efficient
Immigration Court.106 Congress has so far failed to mandate
representation, even for children in Immigration Court. In the very

103.
Current law enables those granted asylum to apply for permanent
resident status one year after the grant, but limits the number of such
adjustments to 10,000 per year. When Congress set that number in 1990 by
doubling the initial ceiling established in the Refugee Act of 1980, it sufficiently
addressed the needs at that time. Congress has yet to update the 1990 ceiling,
even though U.S. society fully expects that those granted asylum are not
returning to their home countries and will remain permanently in the United
States. As of March 1, 2004, there were some 160,000 asylees awaiting
adjustment. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Dep't of Homeland
Security, Adjustment of Status for Asylees, at http://uscis.gov/graphics/
fieldoffices/nebraskalasyleeadj.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2004). USCIS estimated
that the applications received in late 2003 would be processed in FY 2015. To
help integrate these refugees into U.S. society and protect their rights, then,
Congress should eliminate both of these artificial limitations on the number of
asylum grants and status adjustments. In addition and to the same end,
Congress should admit these and all other asylees as legal permanent residents
upon the grant of asylum, as recommended by the Jordan Commission in 1997.
The Jordan Commission recommended immediate adjustment for asylees and
resettled refugees. U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform, U.S. Refugee Policy:
Taking Leadership, 34, 35 (1997), http://www.utexas.edullbj/uscir/refugee/fullreport.pdf(last visited Jan. 26,2004).
104.
Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum
Representation: Ideas for Change, 16 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 739, 766 tbl.1 (2002).
105.
FY 2003 Statistical Yearbook, supra note 87, at G-l. This data is not
broken down with respect tOctypes of cases, such as asylum. In FY 1999, sixtyfour percent of affirmative asylum seekers were represented in Immigration
Court. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 103, at 742.

106.
See Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice,
BIA Pro Bono Project, at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/probonolMajorInitiatives.htm
(last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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Chart 8. Asylum Applications Denied by Immigration Court, 1999-2003

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Source: DOJ, Executive Office for Immigration Review, Asylum Statistics 1999-2003

least, Congress should fund a pilot study of mandated representation
in several Immigration Courts to understand fully the benefits of
such a system to the government and those it has committed to
protect.
In sum, the approval rates in Immigration Court have
continued to be significant and consistent since September 11th.
Major problems-such as artificial limits on the number of asylum
grants and adjustments; and the lack of representation for asylum
seekers-should be addressed by legislation.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT OF IMMIGRATION: IMPACT OF ATTORNEY
GENERAL REFORMS AND PERSONNEL CHANGES AT THE BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS

Asylum claimants, non-citizens seeking other forms of relief,
and DHS Trial Attorneys may appeal an adverse Immigration Judge
decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).1 07 Historically,
107.
Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Board
of Immigration Appeals (biographical information on the BIA), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoiribiainfo.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2004).
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the BIA has been the single most important decision-maker in the
immigration system. It reviews cases nationwide and sets precedents
that Immigration Judges and Asylum Officers must follow. lOS Given
that the Supreme Court issues very few decisions concerning asylum
law, the BIA essentially interprets immigration law for the nation.
While a United States Court of Appeals may disagree with a Board
interpretation, the BIA only has to follow that Court's interpretation
within its limited jurisdiction.
The Attorney General, however, established the BIA by
regulation and has the power to overrule its decisions. lo9 Prior to the
1990s, the Attorney General generally did not exercise that power.
That changed with both Janet Reno and John Ashcroft. In addition,
the Attorney General has complete discretion to appoint and remove
Board members. After September 11th, Attorney General John
Ashcroft completely revamped the powers and composition of the BIA
based on plans developed well before the terrorist attacks. 110
During the 1990s, Attorney General Janet Reno increased
the size of the Board to address an increasing caseload,ll1 In doing
so, she added members from academia, private practice, and
advocacy in order to balance somewhat the predominant government
experience of existing members.ll2 As the caseload continued to grow
over the decade, a backlog developed despite the increased number of
BIA members. In the most significant development of her governance
of the BIA, the Attorney General authorized major changes in the

108.

Id.

109.
Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S, Dep't of Justice, Board
of Immigration Appeals Practice Manual 10 (2004), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoirlbiaiqapracmanual/apptmtn4.htm.
110,
Press Release, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U,S, Dep't of
Justice, Attorney General Issues Final Rule Reforming Board of Immigration
Appeals Procedures (Aug, 23, 2002), http://www,usdoj,gov/eoir/pressl021
BIARestruct,pdf(last visited Jan, 26, 2005),
111,
See Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve
Case Management, 67 Fed, Reg, 54,878, 54,878-54,879 (Aug, 26, 2002)
[hereinafter Final Rule],

112,
Press Release, Executive Office for Immigration Review, U,S, Dep't of
Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review Announces New Appointments
at
the
Board
of Immigration
Appeals
(July
31,
2000),
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/presslOOlbiaappts2000.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
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BIA review process to address this growing backlog. In October 1999,
she gave BIA members the authority in certain circumstances to
issue summary affirmances, that is, decisions without any
analysis.l13 Instead of having every appeal decided by a threemember panel, the BIA issued individual member summary
affirmances in certain categories of cases designated by the BIA
Chairman if the BIA member determined:
that the result reached in the decision under review was
correct; that any errors in the decision under review were
harmless or nonmaterial; and that (A) The issues on appeal
are squarely controlled by existing Board or federal court
precedent and do not involve the application of precedent to
a novel fact situation; or (B) the factual and legal issues
raised on appeal are not so insubstantial that the case
warrants the issuance of a written opinion in the case. 1l4

Andersen LLP performed an independent audit to evaluate
the effectiveness of the new streamlining as it was implemented
between September 2000 and August 2001. 115 In FY 2001, for the
first time in a number of years, the BIA completed about 4,000 more
cases than it received. The auditor reported a fifty-three percent
increase in the overall number of cases completed during the
implementation period. 116 The auditor also reported that the
available data did not indicate an adverse effect on non-citizens. The
Andersen report concluded that the new streamlining rules resulted
in an unqualified success.u 7

113.
§

Final Rule, supra note 111, at 54,879.

114.
Executive Office for Immigration Review, General Provisions, 8 C.F.R.
1003.1 (2004).

Anderson LLP, Board of Immigration Appeals Streamlining Pilot
115.
Project Assessment Report (2001) (independent study conducted for the Executive
Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep't of Justice), reprinted in Dorsey &
Whitney, LLP, Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve
Case Management app. 21, at 138 (2003) (study conducted for the American Bar
Association Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono)
[hereinafter Dorsey & Whitney Study], http://www.dorsey.comlfiles/upload/
DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
116.

[d. at 5-8.

117.

[d.
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The independent auditor reported this in December 200l.
Despite the positive findings and conclusions, just two months later
Attorney General John Ashcroft authorized new policies in the name
of streamlining that fundamentally changed the nature of the BIA's
review function. In addition, he radically changed the composition of
the Board.
The February 2002 proposed rule, which became final in
August 2002,118 resulted in three major changes. First, single
member became "the dominant method of adjudication for the large
majority of cases",119 and single member summary affirmances
became commonplace.l 20 Second, the Ashcroft streamlining
effectively eliminated the BIA's de novo review of factual issues that
had existed for almost half a century.121 The new rule accomplished
this by establishing "the primacy of the immigration judges as
factfinders" and requiring the Board to defer to the Immigration
Judge unless a decision is "clearly erroneous."122 To understand the
far reaching nature of this change, it is necessary to understand why
the Board exercised this power throughout the second half of the
twentieth century. Former BIA Chairman Paul Schmidt articulated
the rationale for the Board's de novo powers in his dissent in Matter
orA.S.:
In many cases, the expertise, independence, and
sound judgment of this Board is all that stands between an
asylum applicant and return to a place where he or she will
face persecution or death. It is quite possible that we review
more asylum adjudications than any other tribunal in the
world. Certainly, each Board Member adjudicates many
more asylum cases, from a wider variety of nationalities,
than any individual Immigration Judge. We also have a
nationwide jurisdiction and a perspective that is not
present in the Immigration Courts.

118.

Final Rule, supra note 113.

119.

Id. at 54,879.

120.
Letter from Larry Levine, Counsel for Legislative and Public Affairs,
EOIR Office of Management Programs, to Stuart Drown, City Editor of The
Sacramento
Bee
(Sept.
21,
2004),
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/
LtrtoEditorSacBee.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
121.

See, e.g., In Re B-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 1 (BIA 1955, A.G. 1956).

122.

Final Rule, supra note 113, at 54,881.
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While we may lack the advantage of a face-to-face
observation of the witness, we have the very substantial,
and much underrated, advantage of being able to review a
written transcript. We also have a talented professional
staff to assist us in reviewing the record. In addition, the
absence of personal interaction with the parties and their
counsel in the trial courtroom insulates us from the almost
inevitable, and often distracting, frustrations and
extraneous factors that could accompany such personal
interaction, particularly in a 'high-volume' trial system like
the Immigration Court. Moreover, we have the opportunity
for collegial discussion and the application of shared
expertise to difficult appellate issues.
Therefore, it is not clear to me why our vantage point is
necessarily less revealing than that of the Immigration
Judge and why we want to give such great deference to the
Immigration Judge, rather than relying on our own
expertise and sound, independent judgment after review of
the written record on appeal. 123

As noted by David Martin, former INS General Counsel and
professor of law at the University of Virginia, Immigration Judges
adjudicate very large caseloads and "are under 'real pressure to
conclude their cases and move forward' ... which is why they tend to
dictate their opinions at the end of the proceedings, unlike federal
judges who may take weeks to consider and write an opinion."124 In
such a demanding system, serious mistakes are made regarding both
factual and legal findings.

Third, in addition to soundly rejecting this historical power of
the BIA, the new rule reduced the membership of the Board from
twenty-three to eleven authorized positions. 125 According to the
Federal Register, the Attorney General based this determination "on
judgments made about the historic capacity of appellate courts and
administrative appellate bodies to adjudicate the law, the ability of
individuals to reach consensus on legal issues, and the requirements
of the existing and projected caseload. "126 In the actual downsizing,
123.

In re A-S-, 21 1.& N. Dec. 1106, 1114 (BIA Feb. 19, 1998).

124.
Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar & Jonathan Peterson, 5 on Immigration
Board Asked to Leave; Critics Call It a 'Purge', L.A. Times, Mar. 12, 2003, at A16.
125.

Final Rule, supra note 113, at 54,881.

126.

Id. at 54,893.
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the Attorney General targeted the newer members who came from
the practice of asylum and immigration law, advocacy, and academia.
In endorsing the removal of these members, the Executive Director of
the Center for Immigration Studies, which advocates significant
restrictions on immigration, observed that "Board members should
clearly represent the attorney general's views, since they are
carrying out his responsibility. "127 Finally, during the downsizing
transition, the Attorney General required BIA members to clear their
current backlog of about 55,000 cases within 180 days.128 According
to Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers' Committee for Human
Rights), each Board member essentially had to decide thirty-two
cases every work day, or one every fifteen minutes. 129
Not surprisingly, the Ashcroft changes were controversial. A
July 2003 study conducted for the American Bar Association
Commission on Immigration Policy, Practice and Pro Bono by the law
firm of Dorsey & Whitney found that while the number of appeals
granted or remanded remained steady between June 2000 and
October 2002, the number of denials doubled.1 30 The grant rate
declined from twenty-five percent before the spring of 2002 to ten .
percent afterwards. Lori Scialabba, appointed Chair of the BIA by
Attorney General Ashcroft,131 responded that the study relied on

127.

Alonso-Zaldivar & Peterson, supra note 124, at A16.

Media Alert, Human Rights First, New Regulations Threaten to Turn
128.
Board of Immigration Appeals into Rubber Stamp (Aug. 28, 2002), at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/media/2002_alerts/0828.htm (last visited Jan.
26,2005).
129.
Human Rights First, supra note 126. See also Lisa Getter & Jonathan
Peterson, Speedier Rate of Deportation Rulings Assailed, L.A. Times, Jan. 5,
2003, at Al (asserting that Ashcroft's overhaul of the system led to Board
members having to decide cases in "minutes").
130.

Dorsey & Whitney Study, supra note 115, app. 24 at 235.

131.
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Attorney General Ashcroft
Appoints Lori Scialabba as Chairman of the Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug.
23,2002), at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2002lAugustl02_eoir390.htm:
Ms. Scialabba began her career with the DOJ in October 1985
through the Attorney General's Honor Program and served as
a trial attorney for the INS in Chicago, where she litigated
deportation cases. From 1986 to 1989, she served as Assistant
General Counsel for INS Headquarters in Washington, D.C. In
1989, she joined the Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil
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"outdated and unsubstantiated data from a Los Angeles Times article
published in January 2003."132
The impact of the new rules on the federal judiciary has been
very serious. The Dorsey & Whitney study showed that the new rules
have resulted in more than an 800% increase in appeals from BIA
decisions to the federal circuit courtS. 133 Overwhelmed with this
surge, the federal circuit courts of appeal have developed their own
backlog of BIA decisions.
These changes are extreme, and no evidence suggests that
dramatic changes to the procedures and membership of this very
important administrative appeals agency were necessary. Before the
Attorney General instituted these reforms, the BIA had already
demonstrated its capacity to address the size of the annual caseloads.
As noted in the Federal Register, the Board received over 27,000
cases in FY 2001 and decided over 31,000.134 In fact, the Department
of Justice reported in the Federal Register that it agreed "with the
fundamental assessment that the Board's [initial] use of the
streamlining process has been successful."135 If the Attorney General
were truly concerned with addressing the backlog in a fair way, he
could have required the Board to follow the very successful approach
implemented by the 1995 asylum reforms: last in, first out. This
allowed the Asylum Office to discourage abuse and ensure that
refugees did not have to wait long periods of time for decisions. The
Asylum Office quickly demonstrated its ability to handle the
incoming caseload and then proceeded to decide backlogged cases in a
fair manner.

Division at DOJ as a trial attorney until 1991. She held the
position of Associate General Counsel at the INS from 1991 to
1994 when she was appointed Deputy General Counsel for the
INS. She held that position until her appointment to the BIA.
Attorney General Reno appointed Ms. Scialabba to the Board in 1998. [d.
132.
Letter from Lori Scialabba, Chairman, Board of Immigration Appeals,
to Charles Carter, Editor-in-Chief, National Law Journal (Dec. 8, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/03IBIANLJresponse120803.pdf (last visited Jan.
26,2005).
133.

Dorsey & Whitney Study, supra note 115, app. 26 at 237.

134.

Final Rule, supra note 113, at 54,878.

135.

[d. at 54,879.
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Furthermore, no evidence has come to light suggesting that
the Board's de novo review powers interfered with its ability to
address a large caseload. Moreover, by ordering the BIA to issue very
large numbers of decisions without any analysis and by removing de
novo review, the Attorney General has stripped the Board of its
capacity to ensure the accuracy of Immigration Judge decisions. The
Attorney General also diminished the fairness of the review function
by removing members for ideological reasons.
Accuracy, consistency, and public acceptance are among the
most important goals of any adjudicative system,136 The mere
prospect of independent review encourages more thoughtful
deliberation at the initial hearing stage, according to experts,137 In
FY 2003, some 33,500 of 198,000 Immigration Judge decisions
(seventeen percent) were appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals by either non-citizens or the government,138 Subsequent to
the limited review procedures established by the Attorney General,
most decisions by Immigration Judges are summarily affirmed
without explanation by a single member of the Board of Immigration
Appeals. 139 Since such decisions do not provide any analysis, they
cannot ensure consistent legal standards. Moreover, no one can know
whether such decisions are accurate unless they are appealed to the
United States Courts of Appeal.
To ensure accurate and consistent legal standards and
address the sweeping changes described above, Congress must
intervene to establish an immigration review system independent of
the chief law enforcement officer of the land. The Jordan Commission
called for this change in 1997. 140 It is ever more pressing today.

136.
See Stephen H. Legomsky, An Asylum Seeker's Bill of Rights in a NonUtopian World, 14 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 619, 622 (2000).
137.

[d. at 641.

138.

FY 2003 Statistical Year Book, supra note 87, at Y1.

139.

[d.

140.
U.S. Comm'n on Immigration Reform, Becoming an American:
Immigration and Immigrant Policy, 175-183 (1997), available at
http://www.utexas.edullbj/uscirlbecoming/full-report.pdf.
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V. ENSURING THAT REFUGEES CAN SEEK AsYLUM AND FIND
PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES AND IN THE REGION: THE
TREATMENT OF HAITIAN AsYLUM SEEKERS

Since the terrorist attacks, the U.S. government has treated
Haitian asylum seekers with extremely harsh policies. First, in order
to discourage Haitians from trying to reach U.S. shores by boat, U.S.
immigration officials detained hundreds who had arrived on two
separate boats about a year apart and expedited their asylum
cases,141 When some 170 Haitian asylum seekers arrived by boat in
Florida in December 2001, the INS instituted the new detention
policy.142 In October 2002, more than 200 Haitians reached the U.S.
coast by boat and swam ashore near Key Biscayne, Florida. Nineteen
Haitians from this boat were picked up by the Coast Guard before
they reached dry land and were reportedly returned to Haiti. 143 In
support of the new detention policy, the INS reportedly invoked a
controversial regulation that had been established after the terrorist
attacks and essentially gave INS Trial Attorneys the power to
overturn an Immigration Judge's decision to release a detainee on
bond. That regulation enabled the United States to detain Arab and
Muslim non-citizens for prolonged periods without charging them
with any terrorist or other criminal activity,144
According to the Department of Justice, these policies were
aimed at discouraging a mass exodus from a destabilizing Haiti in
order to preserve U.S. Coast Guard and Naval resources to guard
against terrorist attacks. 145 The Department did not provide any
evidence that such policies could deter a mass exodus in times of civil
conflict or crisis. Lawyers for one Haitian detainee challenged the
141.
See Human Rights First, Haitian Refugees and the U.S. Asylum
System, at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/asylumiasylum_04.htm (last visited
Jan. 26, 2005); Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children, Refugee
Policy Adrift: The United States and Dominican Republic Deny Haitians
Protection 20-32 (2003), available at http://www.womenscommission.org/
pdflht.pdf.

142.
Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children, supra note
141, at 29.
143.

Id. at 30.

144.

Id. at 32.

145.

Id. at 31-32.

HeinOnline -- 36 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 360 2004-2005

2005 REFUGEE PROTECTION IN THE U.S. POST 9/11

361

policy and successfully convinced the Immigration Court and the BIA
that U.S. law requires an individualized determination of release and
that this particular Haitian asylum seeker merited release on bond
to the custody of his family.146 The newly established Department of
Homeland Security immediately asked the Attorney General to block
the release of Haitian asylum seekers. This move evoked a storm of
criticism from refugee advocates who argued that the U.S.
government was dangerously exploiting the very real national
security problems faced by the American people after the September
11th attacks. 147 Within a month of the DHS request, the Attorney
General issued a precedent decision overturning the BIA, resulting in
the detention of the Haitian asylum seekers until their asylum
claims were final. I48
Those Haitian asylum seekers who did not reach U.S. shores
received extremely harsh treatment from the President himself.
During the instability at the time of the ouster of President Aristide
in March 2004, thousands of Haitians tried to escape the island. In
response, President George W. Bush himself declared that the
United States would return all refugees to Haiti: "I have made it
abundantly clear to the Coast Guard that we will turn back any
refugee that attempts to reach our shore. And that message needs to
be very clear, as well, to the Haitian people."149 The Coast Guard
interdicted and returned almost 2,000 Haitian asylum seekers
between February and April 2004, after which the number of
interdictions decreased. 150

146.

See In re D-J-, 23 I & N Dec. 572, 573 (A.G. 2003).

147.
Media Alert, Human Rights First, Recent Victory for Haitian Refugees
Thwarted by Department of Homeland Security; Major Refugee Rights
Organizations Decry Decision (Mar. 21, 2003), at http://www.humanrightsfirst.
org/media/2003_alerts/0321.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2005).
148.

In re D-J-, 23 1& N Dec. 572, 574 (A.G. 2003).

149.
President George W. Bush, Remarks by the President in Photo
Opportunity with Georgian President Saakashvili (Feb. 25, 2004), at
http://www. whitehouse.gov/newslreleasesl2004l02l20040225-1.html (last visited
Jan. 26, 2005).
150.
U.S. Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction, FY 2004 Flow
Statistics, at http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-o/g-opVamio/flowstatslfy2004 migrant
flow.xls (last visited on Jan. 26, 2004).
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This is not the first time that the United States has directly
returned Haitian asylum seekers. The first President Bush
established the direct return policy in May 1992, and President
Clinton kept it in place until 1994. 151 These three Administrations
have asserted that direct return does not violate the core
international protection obligation agreed to by the United States as
stated in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention: 152 "No
Contracting State shall expel or return ("refouler") a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion."153 The Reagan Administration read this straightforward
language to mean that the United States must first determine
whether a Haitian interdicted on the high seas is a refugee before
taking any action to return him, and recorded that understanding in
an agreement with Baby Doc Duvalier's regime.1 54 Nonetheless, the
United States Supreme Court cleared the legal way for Presidents to
mistreat Haitians by holding that direct return without any
screening after interdiction on the high seas does not violate the U.S.
obligation not to return refugees to countries of persecution.155 No
President had previously referred to Haitian asylum seekers as
"refugees" and then determined that such refugees will be returned
directly to Haiti. While the second President Bush may be more
honest about who is being returned, he flouts the core principle of
protection found in this international treaty by doing so.

151.
Exec. Order No. 12,807,57 Fed. Reg. 23133 (May 24, 1992). President
Clinton decided not to modifY that order after he assumed office. See Sale v.
Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1993). For a full discussion of the
non-refoulement obligation, see Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Aiding and Abetting
Persecutors: The Seizure and Return of Haitian Refugees in Violation of the U.N.
Refugee Convention and Protocol, 7 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 67 (1993).

152.

See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S at 164-65.

153.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951,
art. 33, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6276, 189 D.N.T.S. 137, 176 (entered into force Apr. 22,
1954).

154.
See Agreement to Stop Clandestine Migration of Residents of Haiti to
the United States, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3559.
155.

Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. at 164-65.
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The United States government can and should find better
ways to balance the responsibility to protect its own citizens and
residents from terrorism and the responsibility to protect those
fleeing persecution and serious harm. Certainly the United States
must ensure that those who come to the United States do not
threaten our security. But the President should never tell refugees
that they should not try to flee persecution or harm. Nor should the
United States pretend that detaining asylum seekers in the United
States will prevent a mass exodus, since no evidence supporting such
a claim exists. The United States can and must protect both refugees
and its own citizens and residents.
The answer to the immediate flow of Haitian asylum seekers
is regional protection.l 56 That means protection for some in the
United States and for others elsewhere in the region. While the
challenges to developing such shared responsibility are significant,
the President's solution both harms people who deserve protection
and diminishes the international leadership role that the United
States needs to perform in encouraging other states to protect
refugees. Given that most refugees seek asylum in developing
states 157 , this leadership role is critical to an effective international
protection system.
The United States can also show leadership by protecting
refugees fleeing conflict. Most of the asylum seekers who seek
protection in the United States come from such countries. While the
United States protects those with a well-founded fear of persecution,
U.S. laws do not provide any humanitarian status on an individual
basis to those who have a well founded fear of death. A limited group
protection is provided at the discretion of the Secretary of Homeland
Security, but even that highly political determination does not
protect people fleeing an ongoing civil conflict.l 58 While the United

156.
For a full discussion of temporary protection, see Susan Martin, et aI.,
Temporary Protection: Towards A New Regional and Domestic Framework, 12
Geo. Immigr. L.J. 543 (1998).
157.
See UNHCR, 2003 Global Refugee Trends 11 tbl. 1 (June 15, 2004),
available at www.unhcr.chlstatistics.
158.
See Immigration and Nationality Act, Ch. 477, Sec. 244(b)(l), 66 Stat.
163, 216 (1952) amended by Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, Sec.
302(a), 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) and Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996).
Temporary Protection Status provides protection only to those already in the
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States generally does not deport such refugees, the laws leave them
without rights to stay in the United States and pursue livelihoods.
Rather than leave such individuals without rights, the United States
should establish an individual humanitarian status to protect those
fleeing civil conflict.159

VI. CONCLUSION
The overall U.S. protection picture for asylum seekers since
September 11th is disturbing. Fewer asylum seekers are reaching
the United States. Approval rates in the first instance have seriously
declined. The Attorney General has politicized and severely
restricted the review function. The rights of many asylum seekers
are disrespected, whether they make it to the United States or are
intercepted on the high seas.
Since September 11th, the United States has focused on
fighting terrorism at a serious cost to our humanitarian programs.
This article has analyzed the problems and achievements of the U.S.
asylum system during this period and recommended ways to address
those problems. The United States has a responsibility to protect its
citizens and refugees in a more balanced way. By adopting these
recommendations, the government will better be able to accomplish
this goal.

United States when it is authorized by the Secretary of Homeland Security.
159.

See Martin et al., supra note 156, at 566-80.
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